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NOTES
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-ANTI-POVERTY LEG
ISLATION IN THE MODERN ERA: ADVOCATING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
UNDER A FEMINIST POLICy-CENTERED ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act ("the FLSA"
or "the Act") in 1938. 1 The major provisions of this Act established
a minimum wage fioor 2 and overtime provisions 3 for employees
"engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com
merce."4 Emerging as the country struggled to recover from the
Great Depression, the Act represented a collective effort granting
hope of economic prosperity for millions of American workers.
Fundamental to the purpose of the Act was the notion that
[t]his nation cannot build a stable industry that can adequately
support all its people until those who work are given a larger
share in the yield. . . . Continued low wage incomes ... will
continue to undermine the stability of markets for both farm and
factory products. It is only by a wider distribution of our national
income that we can expand our markets, increase production and
gradually eliminate unemployment.5

Balanced against this sentiment, however, was the fear that the
minimum wage and overtime rates would effectively "throw[]
thousands of people out of work" as employers struggled to make
the same profit while paying higher wages. 6 Thus, the FLSA at
tempted to strike a delicate balance between eradicating the detri
mental conditions of some workers, and preserving entry-level, low
skill positions in the economy.?
1. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)).
2. See § 6, 52 Stat. at 1062-63 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 206 (1994)).
3. See § 7(a)(1)-(3), 52 Stat. at 1063 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1994)).
4. § 6(a), 52 Stat. at 1062 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1994)).
5. 83 CONGo REc. H9264 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Rep. Keller).
6. 83 CONGo REC. S9171 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Sen. Bailey).
7. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of the 1938 version of the FLSA.
229
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In 1961, Congress amended the FLSA and expanded the cover
age by shifting the focus of the Act from the employee to the enter
prise. 8 In this amendment, Congress extended the Act's provisions
to employees of large "enterprisers] engaged in commerce or the
production of goods for commerce."9 The enterprise concept thus
broadened the focus of the FLSA from an employee's activity to
the nature of an employer's business.lO Once again, some members
of Congress voiced the concern that increasing the scope of the
Act's coverage would further decrease the number of entry-level,
low-skill jobs available to part-time workers, the elderly, and
students.1 1
The most recent amendment to the enterprise concept oc
curred in 1972 when Congress added "preschool" to the definition
of enterprise.n In doing so, however, Congress not only failed to
include a definition of "preschool,"13 it also failed to substantively
debate the purpose of treating a "preschool" as a covered enter
prise. Consequently, the scope of the term "preschool" is
ambiguous.
This Note analyzes the interpretive methods employed by fed
eral courts in determining what type of business is considered a
"preschool" within the meaning of the Act. This Note concludes
that the confusion in the courts concerning what businesses are con
8. See Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 203 (1994»; see infra notes 35 and 36 for the definitions of "enterprise" and
"enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce."
9. § 2(s), 75 Stat. at 65 (emphasis added).
10. The constitutionality of the enterprise concept was the subject of heated de
bate in Congress and vigorously litigated in the courts. See generally 107 CONGo REC.
H4589 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1961) (statements of Rep. Hiestand) (debating the constitu
tionality of the enterprise concept); see also Maryland V. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 204
(1968), overruled on other grounds by National League of Cities V. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (holding that the "enterprise concept" in the 1961 amendment to the FLSA is
constitutional). The substance of the debate surrounded whether Congress had, in cre
ating the "enterprise concept," gone beyond the power granted Congress in the Com
merce Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
11. See 107 CONGo REc. S5952 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1961) (statement of Sen.
Bennett).
12. Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906, 86 Stat. 235, 375 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.c. § 203(r)(1), (s)(4) (1994». See infra note 77 for the text of the
1972 amendment to the FLSA.
13. Compare Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906, 86 Stat. 235, 275
with 29 U.S.C. § 203(v), (w) (1994). See infra notes 67 and 68 for the definitions of
"elementary" and "secondary" school. In this amendment, Congress made its intent
clear by defining what "elementary" and "secondary" schools were and how the Act's
provisions related to the state's authority to regulate elementary and secondary schools.
29 U.S.C. § 203(v), (w) (1994).
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sidered "preschools" under the 1972 amendment to the FLSA is
justified. Federal courts have had difficulty interpreting the word
"preschool" because either a broad or a narrow interpretation pro
duces results that are inconsistent with the FLSA's anti-poverty
purpose. Until these inadequacies are addressed by Congress, fed
eral courts must continue to interpret a vague amendment that fails
to resolve the underlying policy tensions evident in the Act.
This Note asserts that without congressional clarification of
what businesses are considered a "preschool," the only effective
method of interpreting the 1972 amendment is a policy-centered ap
proach. A policy-centered method is advocated because the tradi
tional methods of interpretation collapse under the weight of an
issue that is inextricably entwined with public policy issues. Fur
thermore, although other interpretive methods exist that would ad
dress the conflict in policy,14 this Note advocates a feminist policy
centered analysis. This feminist perspective recognizes that either a
broad or narrow interpretation of the 1972 amendment adversely
impacts low-income women-a result entirely at odds with the fun
damental purposes of the Act.
For instance, a broad interpretation that holds that preschool
workers should be paid minimum wage may ultimately result in in
creased costs for day care. This increased cost, without adequate
subsidies, disproportionately impacts low-income women's ability
to participate in the economy on equal terms. Similarly, because
women comprise the majority of the workforce in the pre-kinder
garten childcare industry,15 a narrow interpretation that does not
confer rights under the FLSA, results in a disproportionate impact
on a predominately female sector of the workforce.
Finally, this Note argues that the judiciary should, in the inter
est of justice, fully articulate and comment on the conflicting policy
issues that arise in interpreting the Act. The Act provides a mecha
nism that justifies such a discourse. 16 Section 204( d)(1) of the Act
provides for biennial reports by the Department of Labor to Con
14. For example, practical reasoning, or the use of positive political theory as a
method of interpretation might broaden the analysis beyond the limitations of the three
traditional methods of interpretation used by the courts. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321 (1990); McNollgast, Comment, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political The
ory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994).
15. See infra note 126 for Bureau of Labor Statistics regarding workforce
demographics in the pre-kindergarten child care industry.
16. See 29 U.S.c. § 204(d)(I) (1994). This Note does not advocate that the courts
rewrite the statute in conformity with its policy analysis. Rather, this Note asserts that
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gress to suggest legislative reformP Thus, the judiciary, through a
policy-centered analysis, may help identify the deficiencies in the
Act's provisions.
Part I of this Note will explore the historical background of the
FLSA and its major amendments leading to the treatment of "pre
school" as a covered enterprise. Part II provides the reader with a
brief overview of the methods of statutory interpretation used by
federal courts in interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA,
and reviews analtemative feminist method of statutory interpreta
tion. Part III analyzes the interpretational approaches employed by
federal courts in addressing the question of what businesses are
within the scope of the FLSA through the inclusion of "preschool"
as a covered enterprise. Part IV comments on the effectiveness of
the various interpretational approaches employed by these courts
and proposes a policy-centered method of analysis that is founded
on feminist concerns.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938

On June 25, 1938 Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards
18
Act. In passing the Act, Congress was concerned with "the exist
ence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the mainte
nance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, effi
ciency, and general well-being of workers."19 Thus, the FLSA was
created to correct, as quickly as possible, employment conditions
that Congress believed were detrimental to the worker. 20 To effec
tuate this goal, the FLSA created a minimum wage floor 21 and a
ceiling of a maximum number of hours 22 for each "employee who is
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
the courts utilize the statutory mechanism provided by Congress to comment on the
policy implications, in an effort to facilitate legislative reform.
17. See id.
18. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 2-19, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 V.S.c. §§ 201-219 (1994».
19. § 2(a), 52 Stat. at 1060 (current version at 29 V.S.C. § 202(a) (1994)).
20. See § 2(b), 52 Stat. at 1060 (current version at 29 V.S.c. § 202(b) (1994)). "It
is hereby declared policy of this Act ... to correct and as rapidly as practicable to
eliminate the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially cur
tailing employment or earning power." [d.
21. See § 6, 52 Stat. at 1062-63 (current version at 29 V.S.c. § 206 (1994)).
22. See § 7, 52 Stat. at 1063-64 (current version at 29 V.S.c. § 207(a)(2) (1994».
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commerce. "23
Congress, however, feared that too radical a change would
counteract the Act's stated purpose of correcting detrimental em
ployment conditions and result instead in the elimination of posi
tions altogether. 24 Underlying this fear was the belief that if
employers had limited money for wages, imposing a minimum wage
would necessarily lead to the elimination of other positions.25 To
address this fear and to ensure a smooth transition, the provisions
of the Act were to be implemented gradually, with full effect occur
ring seven years after the effective date of the Act. 26
Congress created the FLSA to address specific labor conditions
that had contributed to
[t]he exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal
position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively
defenseless against the denial of a living wage [that] is not only
detrimental to their health and well-being but casts a direct bur
den for their support upon the community.27

Congress passed the FLSA pursuant to the legislative power dele
gated to Congress by the Commerce Clause as the United States
23. §§ 6(a), 7(a), 52 Stat. at 1062-63 (current version at 29 v.s.c. §§ 206(a),
207(a) (1994)). The FLSA also prohibited the use of oppressive child labor in activities
related to interstate commerce. See § 12(a)-(b), 52 Stat. at 1067 (current version at 29
V.S.C. § 213(C) (1994)). Additionally, the FLSA includes numerous other exemptions
that are beyond the scope of this Note. See § 13,52 Stat. at 1067-68 (current version at
29 V.S.c. § 213(a)-(h) (1994)).
24. See § 2(b), 52 Stat. at 1060 (current version at 29 V.S.C. § 202(b) (1994)).
25. See 83 CONGo REC. S9164 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Sen.
Thomas) ("We all recognized the hazard of placing this floor too high at the start with
out giving industry time to adjust itself.").
26. See § 6(a)(I)-(3), 52 Stat. at 1062-63 (current version at 29 V.S.c. § 206(b)
(1994)):
(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in com
merce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following
rates
(1) during the first year from the effective date of this section, not less
than 25 cents an hour,
(2) during the next six years from such date, not less than 30 cents an
hour,
(3) after the expiration of seven years from such date, not less than 40
cents an hour, or the rate (not less than 30 cents an hour) prescribed in the
applicable order of the Administrator issued under section 8, whichever is
lower.

Id.
27. 83 CoNG. REc. HA2111 (appendix to daily ed. May 23, 1938) (remarks of
Rep. Cochran) (quoting the commentary of Hughes, c.J., from an editorial in the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, May 22, 1938).
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was emerging from the Great Depression. 28 By exerting financial
pressure on employers through the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the Act, Congress helped employees gain bargaining
power. 29 This increased bargaining power contributed to improving
the labor conditions of many workers. Additionally, because the
Act's overtime provisions discouraged overtime, work was distrib
uted more equitably among a greater number of employees, thus
lowering unemployment rates. 30
Congress recognized that amendments to the Act would be
needed as the country's labor conditions evolved. 31 Accordingly,
the Act contains a provision under which the Administrator of the
Wage and Hour Division is to compile data biennially and make
any necessary legislative recommendations for future amendments
to the Act. 32
B.

The 1961 Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act
The 1961 amendment to the FLSA expanded the Act's cover

28. See u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. In congressional debates and after enact
ment, some questioned whether Congress had, in enacting the FLSA, exceeded the
powers granted it under the Commerce Clause. See Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.,
317 U.S. 564 (1943). In Jacksonville Paper, the Supreme Court broadly construed Con
gress's purpose for enacting the FLSA as extending federal control over the wages and
hours of the employee to the "farthest reaches." Jacksonville Paper, 317 U.S. at 567; see
also Mitchell v. C & P Shoe Corp., 286 F.2d 109,114 (5th Cir. 1960) (holding that the
activities of the individual employee, not the employer's activities, determine coverage
under the Act; thus, Congress was within the limits of its commerce power); Robert N.
Willis, The Evolution of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 607, 613
(1972) (indicating that Jacksonville Paper is considered the foundation for the notion
that the Act should be liberally construed to effectuate Congress's objectives).
29. See Murray v. Noblesville Milling Co., 131 F.2d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir. 1942)
(stating that the requirements of the FLSA reinforce employees' bargaining power by
prohibiting wages to be below a certain level).
30. In modern times, due to the proliferation and expense of fringe benefits, some
employers require regular overtime as a condition of employment because it is less
expensive than hiring a new employee. See Alfred W. Blumrosen & Jerome M. Culp,
Reducing the Workweek to Expand Employment: A Survey of Industrial Response, 9
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 393, 412 (1984) ("[Elmployers faced with the choice between let
ting their full-time employees work overtime or hiring more employees will balance
overtime against initial hiring costs, which can amount to thousands of dollars.").
31. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 4(d), 52 Stat. 1060, 1062
(current version at 29 U.S.c. § 204(d)(1) (1994».
32. See id. In its biennial report to Congress, the Secretary of Labor reports liti
gation activity relevant to enforcement of the FLSA. See, e.g., EMPLOYMENT STAN.
DARDS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS
STANDARDS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (1993) (reporting for 1991)
[hereinafter 1991 MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS REpORT TO CONGRESS1; see
infra Part IV for a recommendation of how this section of the Act should be used by
the judiciary.
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age to include employees of enterprises "engaged. in commerce or
in the production of goods for commerce. "33 Congress enacted this
amendment to promote a more widespread distribution of purchas
ing power essential to the growth of the economy.34 To clarify the
scope of the amendment, Congress defined "enterprise"35 and the
phrase "enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of
goods for commerce. "36
33. Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 6, 75 Stat. 65, 69 (current version at
29 U.S.c. § 203 (1994». Previously, coverage had been based upon "each employee
who is engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce." Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062-63 (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206 (1994». Thus, the 1961 amendment shifted the focus from the employee to the
nature of the employer's business. This shift became known as the "enterprise con
cept." See, e.g., Marshall v. Sideris, 524 F. Supp. 521, 527 (D. Neb. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Donovan v. Sideris, 688 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1982) (the enterprise con
cept extended coverage under the FLSA).
34. See 107 CONGo REC. H4588 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1961) (statement of Rep.
Lane).
35. Act of May 5, 1961 § 2(r), 75 Stat. at 65 (current version at 29 U.S.c.
§ 203(r)(I) (1994». Section 2(r) defines "enterprise" as:
[T]he related activities performed (either through unified operation or com
mon control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and
includes all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments
or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including depart
ments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements, but shall
not include the related activities performed for such enterprise by an in
dependent contractor.
Id.
36. § 2(s), 75 Stat. at 66 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1994». Section
2(s) defines "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com
merce" as:
[A]ny of the following in the activities of which employees are so engaged,
including employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that
have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person:
(1) any such enterprise which has one or more retail or service establish
ments if the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is not less than
$1,000,000, exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately
stated and if such enterprise purchases or receives goods for resale that move
or have moved across State lines (not in deliveries from the reselling establish
ment) which amount in total annual volume to $250,000 or more;
(2) any such enterprise which is engaged in the business of operating a
street, suburban or interurban electric railway, or local trolley or motorbus
carrier if the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is not less than
$1,000,000, exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately
stated;
(3) any establishment of any such enterprise, except establishments and
enterprises referred to in other paragraphs of this subsection, which has em
ployees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce if
the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is not less than $1,000,000;
(4) any such enterprise which is engaged in the business of construction
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The enterprise concept broadened coverage under the mini
mum wage and maximum hour provisions by shifting the focus from
an employee's activity to the nature of an employer's business. 37
Under this amendment, employers were required to comply with
the minimum wage and overtime provisions not only for employees
who were engaged in interstate commerce,38 but also for any em
ployee of an enterprise that met the monetary requirements of
coverage. 39
The 1961 amendment corrected an inconsistency in the Act. 40
Previously, the Act focused on the nature of the employee's posi
tion. This focus resulted in a discrepancy because within one busi
ness, one employee might work on goods that go into interstate
commerce, while other employees might not be working with such
or reconstruction, or both, if the annual gross volume from the business of
such enterprise is not less than $350,000;
(5) any gasoline service establishment if the annual gross volume of sales
of such establishment is not less than $250,000, exclusive of excise taxes at the
retail level which are separately stated:
Provided, That an establishment shall not be considered to be an enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or a part of
an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com
merce, and the sales of such establishment shall not be included for the pur
pose of determining the annual gross volume of sales of any enterprise for the
purpose of this subsection, if the only employees of such establishment are the
owner thereof or persons standing in the relationship of parent, spouse, or
child of such owner.
[d.

37. See Marshall v. Whitehead, 463 F. Supp. 1329, 1359 (D. Fla. 1978) ("The in
tent of Congress in adopting the 'enterprise' concept was to extend coverage of the Act
to all employees of an employer if some of his employees met the commerce crite
rion."); see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled on other grounds by
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Wirtz, 28 states brought an
action claiming that the 1966 amendments were unconstitutional as they applied to the
states. See id. at 187-88. In this landmark case, the Supreme Court held that the 1961
amendment was created to extend protection to the "fellow employees of any employee
who would have been protected by the original Act, but not to enlarge the class of
employers subject to the Act." Id. at 188. That is, prior to the 1961 amendment, a
particular employer might have some employees covered and others not covered at all,
depending on their individual jobs. See id.
38. See Act of May 5,1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, §§ 5-6, 75 Stat. 65, 69-70 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1994». See supra note 26 for the text of the 1938
version describing the original scope of coverage under the Act. The original language
of the 1938 FLSA minimum wage and overtime provisions required the employee to
have direct involvement in commerce.
39. See § 3(r), (s), 75 Stat. at 65-66 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(r)(I),
(s)(1 )-(5)(1994».
40. See 107 CONGo REC. S5827 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1961) (statement of Sen. Javits)
("One of the objectives of the bill is to minimize those areas in which fragmentation of
coverage already exists.").

1997]

ANTI-POVERTY LEGISLATION IN THE MODERN ERA

237

goods. Therefore, within one business, some employees would be
protected by the Act, but other employees would not be afforded
such protection. The 1961 amendment thus filled the gaps that ex
isted in coverage in the situation where a single employer had some
employees who were covered by the Act and others that were not
covered by the Act. 41 However, the amendment did not necessarily
extend coverage to additional employers because only those em
ployers who already engaged in some form of interstate commerce,
and met the FLSA's economic criteria, were affected. 42
The 1961 amendment passed despite vehement debate in Con
gress. 43 One concern involved fears that the Act would generate
increased labor costs,44 and thus have the counterproductive effect
of actually raising unemployment levels. 45 Members of Congress
feared that the broadened scope would effect entry-level, low-skill
workers, such as students, the elderly, and part time workers
populations of workers that the Act was intended to help.46 Con
gress addressed this issue by creating restrictions on the applicabil
ity of the FLSA to a business unless, for instance, it met a minimum
requisite gross volume of sales. Such restrictions limited the expan
41. See id.
42. See S. REP. No. 87-145, at 3 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620,
1662-63; Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 188 (the purpose of the 1961 amendment was not to enlarge
the class of employers subject to the Act). But see Mack A. Player, Enterprise Coverage
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: An Assessment of the First Generation, 28 VAND.
L. REv. 283, 335 (1975) (noting that Justice Harlan, in Maryland v. Wirtz, created signif
icant confusion by concluding that the 1961 amendment did not enlarge the class of
employers).
43. See, e.g., 107 CoNG. REC. H5951-52 (daily ed. Apr. 14,1961); 107 CONGo REc.
H4808-10 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1961); 107 CONGo REc. H4585-89 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1961);
see also S. REP. No. 87-145, at 76-111, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1671-1706.
44. See S. REP. No. 87-145, at 78, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1674.
45. See 107 CONGo REc. S5952 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1961) (statement of Sen.
Bennett).
[M]any small businesses not previously covered, are going to find it difficult to
meet the minimum wage. . .. The result will be either that they will be forced
to cut marginal producers out of their labor force, or they may be compelled
to go out of business. Either way, the result is unemployment. And the unem
ployment will affect the very same people this bill is supposed to help.
Id.
46. See 107 CONGo REc. S5951 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1961) (statement of Sen.
Bennett).
If this bill passes, who will be hurt? First, the elderly, trying to supplement
social security or other income by low-paying jobs. Second, the handicapped,
and the less efficient workers, who are the first to go when a reduction in work
force becomes necessary. Third, students and other part-time workers.
Id.
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sion of coverage under this amendment. 47
Thus, in order to obtain passage, proponents of the amend
ment were forced to agree upon a complicated regulatory scheme
to determine whether an enterprise was covered under the ACt. 48
For instance, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare report
discussed how business activities would be considered part of a sin
gle enterprise and thus subject the enterprise to the FLSA's provi
sions if such activities are for a "common business purpose."49
However, the Committee report also stated that where the pur
poses of the activities are unrelated to one another, even though
operated by the same employer, the employees not individually en
gaging in interstate commerce were not covered by the FLSA.sO
Because Congress intended only to extend coverage to additional
employees of enterprises that either substantially engaged in com
merce or in the production of goods for commerce,S1 application of
the amendment's new provisions was to be determined on a case
by-case basis.
C.

The 1966 Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act

In 1966 Congress again amended the FLSA.S2 Specifically, the
1966 amendment broadened the scope of coverage under the "en
terprise"s3 and "enterprise engaged in the production of goods for
47. See Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2(s)(1)-(5), 75 Stat. 65,66 (cur
rent version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(s) (1994». The amendment also contained such specific
exemptions as alternate rates for United States territories. See § 5(c), 75 Stat. at 67-69
(current version at 29 U.S.c. § 206(c) (1994».
48. See, e.g., § 2(s)(1)-(5), 75 Stat. at 66 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(s)
(1994».
49. S. REp. No. 87-145, at 40-41, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1660 (report of
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare).
50. See id.
51. See id., reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1662.
52. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat.
830 (current version at 29 U.S.C § 203(m) (1994».
53. § 102(a), 80 Stat. at 831. This amendment redefined the definition of enter
prise to:
For the purposes of this subsection, the activities performed by any person or
persons-(l) in connection with the operation of Ii hospital, an institution pri
marily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective
who reside on the premises of such institution, a school for mentally or physi
cally handicapped or gifted children, an elementary or secondary school, or an
institution of higher education (regardless of whether or not such hospital,
institution, or school is public or private or operated for profit or not for
profit).
Id. (emphasis added).
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commerce"54 concepts. In 1966, the time was ripe for change. The
"war on poverty"55 had been met with great public approval, and
the country was looking for answers to increasing social problems,
particularly in urban areas. 56 Congress recognized that the Act had
not kept pace with the advancing economy. 57 This failure resulted
in disproportionately low wages for large groups of workers. 58
Congress enacted the 1966 amendment in an effort to help alleviate
the circumstances of the working poor and to erase discriminatory
wage patterns. 59 Thus, by expanding the scope of the Act in the
1966 amendment, Congress continued to advance the original pur
pose of the Act as an anti-poverty statute. 60
The creation of a new category61 in the definition of "enter
prise"62 and "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce,"63 extended coverage for minimum wage
54. § l02(c), 80 Stat. at 831-32. The meaning of "enterprise engaged in commerce
or the production of goods for commerce" was changed, in relevant part, to: "[A]n
enterprise which has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, including employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that
have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person ...." Id. See supra note
26 for the text of the 1938 version of the Act which looked to the employees' position
rather than the nature of the employers' business.
55. 112 CONGo REc. H11279 (daily ed. May 24, 1966) (statement of Rep. Dent)
("This [amendment] is an essential effort in our war on poverty.").
56. See 112 CoNG. REc. H11273 (daily ed. May 24, 1966) (statement of Rep.
Powell).
These amendments will also aid in erasing the present discriminatory wage
patterns. Almost two-thirds of all white workers come within the present cov
erage provisions, but less than half of all non white workers are covered ....
1Wo-thirds of all men employed in non-supervisory jobs are covered by the
Act, but only about half of the women in such jobs.
Id.
57. See S. REp. No. 89-1487, at 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002,
3003.
58. See id. at 2-3, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3004.
59. See 112 CoNG. REc. H11273 (daily ed. May 24,1966) (statement of Rep. Pow
ell); see supra note 56 for a statement by Rep. Powell concerning the reason for the
1966 amendment.
60. See 112 CONGo REc. H11275 (daily ed. May 24, 1966) (statement of Rep.
Dent).
The philosophy behind the passage of that bill was that by putting more
money into the hands of the workers, it would create a greater demand for
goods; and a greater demand for goods would create a greater production; and
a greater production would create a greater number of jobs.
Id.
61. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(a),
(c),80 Stat. 830, 831 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(r), (s) (1994».
62. § l02(a), 80 Stat. at 831 (current version at 29 u.s.c. § 203(r)(2) (1994».
63. § l02(c), 80 Stat. at 831-32 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1994».
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and overtime requirements. As a result of the definitional changes,
7.2 million additional workers were covered by the FLSA.64 After
the 1966 amendment, the FLSA covered employees if the employer
met certain monetary requirements, and the enterprise was one of
the following:
[AJ hospital, an institution primarily engaged in the care of the
sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective who reside on the
premises of such institution, a school for mentally or physically
handicapped or gifted children, an elementary or secondary
school, or an institution of higher education (regardless of
whether or not such hospital, institution, or school is public or
private or operated for profit or not for profit).65

Thus, the redefinition of enterprise included within its scope ele
mentary and secondary schools. 66 Additionally, the new terms "el
ementary"67 and "secondary"68 school were defined. These
changes further expanded the scope of enterprise coverage under
the Act.
Opponents of the move to treat elementary and secondary
schools as covered enterprises expressed the fear that the require
ment of minimum and overtime wages would burden already finan
cially strained school systems. 69 A second concern surrounded
what some in Congress felt was the continued potential for the
elimination of low-skill jobs for entry level or part time workers.1°
Although the Senate bill did not include elementary and secon
dary schools in the definition of "enterprise engaged in commerce
or the production of goods for commerce,"71 the House bill,n
64. See S. REP. No. 89-1487, at 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002,
3003.
65. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 § 102(c), 80 Stat. at 832 (current
version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(s) (1994)) (emphasis added).
66. See id.
67. § 102(d), 80 Stat. at 832 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(v) (1994))
('''[e ]lementary school' means a day or residential school which provides elementary
education, as determined under State law").
68. § 102(d), 80 Stat. at 832 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(w) (1994»
('''[s]econdary school' means a day or residential school which provides secondary edu
cation, as determined under State law").
69. See S. REp. No. 89-1487, at 8 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002,
3010. Additionally, some senators questioned the constitutionality of the federal gov
ernment imposing wage requirements on what was considered a state activity. See id.
70. See supra note 46 for a discussion of this concern as raised in the 1961
amendment.
71. S. REP. No. 89-1487, at 6-7, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3009.
72. H.R. REp. No. 89-13712, at 1 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3002.
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which did include elementary and secondary schools, was the ver
sion Congress ultimately passed,?3 However, no recorded debate
exists concerning the inclusion of elementary and secondary
schools. Thus, congressional passage of the House version supports
the inference that Congress determined that the benefits of ex
tending the protection of the FLSA to these enterprises outweighed
the problems associated with extending coverage,?4 Once the en
terprise concept was expanded, unlimited possibilities for further
amplification of this concept existed. 75 One such amplification oc
curred in the 1972 amendment to the FLSA.
D.

The Education Amendments of 1972

As part of its 1972 higher education bill, Congress passed an
other amendment to the FLSA.76 In this amendment, Congress
changed the definition of enterprise by adding "preschool" to the
existing list of activities performed for business purposes,?7 How
ever, unlike the 1966 amendment, Congress failed to define "pre
school."78 The congressional record is devoid of reference to why
Congress included the term "preschool" in the definition of
enterprise.
The question of what type of businesses fall within the list of
covered enterprises under the 1972 addition of "preschool" remains
subject to judicial interpretation. The courts, in analyzing this prob
73. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § l02(a),
(c), 80 Stat. 830, 831-32 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(r)(2), (s) (1994)).
74. See Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191, 1193 n.4 (6th Cir.
1994).
75. See Willis, supra note 28, at 626 ("It is important to note that there are unlim
ited possibilities for amplification of the Act's coverage by the judiciary by way of [Sec
tions 3(r) and 3(s)]."). Another shift that occurred with the 1966 amendments was the
type of federal litigation brought under the FLSA. See id. Previously, litigation fo
cused on the employee-centered basis of coverage. See id. With the 1966 amendments,
litigation shifted to the enterprise coverage concept. See id.
76. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(2)-(3), 86
Stat. 235, 375 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(r), (s) (1994)).
77. Id. Section 203(r)(1) defines enterprise as:
"Enterprise" means the related activities performed ... (1) in connection with
the operation of a hospital, an institution primarily engaged in the care of the
sick, the aged, mentally ill or defective ... , a school for the mentally or physi
cally handicapped or gifted children, a preschool, elementary or secondary
school, or an institution of higher education.
Id. Section 203(s)(5) also includes the term "preschool."
78. Compare Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601,
§ l02(d), 80 Stat. 830, 832 (1966) (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(v), (w) (1994))
with Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906, 86 Stat. 235, 275 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (I), (s)(4) (1994)).
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lem, have principally employed traditional methods of statutory in
terpretation. 79 Only one court has discussed policy-centered
considerations. 80 This Note asserts that the traditional methods of
statutory interpretation employed by federal courts in interpreting
the 1972 amendment to the FLSA are ineffective when, as here,
conflicting legislative policies emerge to cloud the interpretive
process.
II.

ApPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION USED BY
FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE 1972
AMENDMENT TO THE FLSA

In the past fifty years, and particularly since the 1960s, statu
tory law has increasingly replaced the common law. 81 This height
ened activity of the legislature has created additional issues to be
resolved by the judicial branch. 82 The increased use of statutes as
methods of regulation has spurred debate on the proper methods of
statutory interpretation.
There are three principal approaches to statutory interpreta
tion relied upon by federal courts in analyzing the meaning of the
1972 amendment to the FLSA:83 first, the plain meaning rule which
79. See infra Part II for a discussion of the three approaches to statutory interpre
tation used by federal courts in interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, as well
as a discussion of a feminist method of interpretation.
80. See Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191 (6th Cir. 1994).
81. See Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Inter
pretation: A Look at Regents v. Bakke, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 57, 63-64 (1992) (ap
plying a synthetic approach which includes the use of legislative history in interpreting
Title VI); Justice Ellen Ash Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An
Address,43 U. PITT. L. REV. 995,996 (1982) ("It seems to be indisputable that by the
end of the century, our legal landscape will be one in which statutes of one kind or
another will be, not just occasional landmarks, but the dominant feature on the map.").
82. See Lori L. Outzs, Note, A Principled Use of Congressional Floor Speeches in
Statutory Interpretation, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 297 (1995) (advocating the use
of congressional floor speeches in arriving at an interpretation of a statute).
83. The traditional approaches to statutory interpretation used by federal courts
in interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA are under criticism by many theorists.
For instance, Professor Eskridge, in advocating a practical reasoning approach to statu
tory interpretation, has made several criticisms of the traditional approaches to statu
tory interpretation. The traditional methods, which Professor Eskridge calls "grand
theories," suffer common weaknesses:
First, each rests upon questionable premises about the nature of interpretation
and the legislative process. Second, none can systematically produce determi
nate results in the "hard cases," which undermines their claims to "objectiv
ity." Third, although each theory rests upon and subserves important values
that should be considered when interpreting statutes, no theory persuades us
that its cluster of underlying values is so important as to exclude all others.
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states that the self-evident ineaning of the statute's words takes pre
cedence as long as an absurd result will not occur;84 second, a textu
alist approach, which also focuses on the statute's language, but
allows the interpreter to go beyond the particular provision to view
the statute as a whole;85 and third, an intentionalist approach which
examines legislative history in addition to the text to discover Con
gress's intent in enacting the statute or amendment. 86 Courts inter
preting the FLSA have not adhered to anyone these traditional
approaches, but have selectively borrowed from each in their analy
sis of the 1972 amendment.
This Note discusses briefly the traditional approaches to statu
tory interpretation underlying the federal courts' analysis in inter
preting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, as well as a policy
centered approach that is founded on a feminist analysis. This Note
concludes that, in analyzing which businesses are considered
"preschools" within the meaning of the Act, the approaches used
by federal courts thus far fail as interpretive tools because they do
not address the underlying policy tensions evident in the FLSA.
These policy tensions include the Act's purpose as an anti-poverty
statute and Congress's reluctance to implement complimentary leg
islation that would enable the Act's purpose to be effectuated.
Therefore, alternative methods of statutory interpretation, which
bring to light the policy tensions within the Act, must be employed.
A.

The Plain Meaning Rule

Under the plain meaning rule, the particular provision in the
text itself takes precedence over all else. 87 This rule is based on the
theory that "the best way to ascertain the meaning of statutory lan
guage is to consider the language of the statute itself."88 The plain
meaning rule limits the interpretive inquiry to whether interpreta
tion of the plain meaning of the words in the particular factual conEskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 322.
84. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 69; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14,
at 340 (plain meaning posits that "[t]he beginning, and usually the end of statutory
interpretation should be the apparent meaning of the statutory language." (citation
omitted)).
85. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 73.
86. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 345.
87. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 69. "Under the plain meaning doctrine of statu
tory interpretation, the language of the statute is exclusively examined." Id.; see also
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 340.
88. Araujo, supra note 81, at 70.
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text would lead to an absurd result. 89 'If the plain meaning of the
words does not lead to an absurd result, the interpretation ends
there. 90 Thus, "the factual context, the surrounding general circum
stances of the history of the legislative process underlying the stat
ute's passage, rules of construction, and examination of intent or
purpose are irrelevant to an individual interpretation of the
statute."91
The enticement of the plain meaning rule is its simplicity.92
The plain meaning rule draws a bright line at the statute's language.
Thereby, it fails to address the possibility of ambiguity which might
exist within the statute.93 Advocates of the plain meaning rule fre
quently use dictionary definitions to arrive at the "plain meaning"
of a word. 94 However, one problem with the rule is that its simplic
ity often leads to apathy, whereby "judges, in struggling to avoid
legislative history, have 'found' a plain meaning in the text rather
than the ambiguity that leads to deference to agencies. "95 Addi
tionally, the plain meaning rule fails to recognize that the historical
particularity of the interpreter fundamentally affects her under
standing of the value and meaning of words. 96 Thus, one inherent
problem with the plain meaning rule is that it does not have, within
its methodology, a check and balance system that challenges the
89. See id. at 69.
90. However, where an absurd result would occur, plain meaning interpreters will
use other sources. Nevertheless, because plain meaning gives the interpreter great lati
tude in detennining the plain meaning of a word, these other methods may never be
utilized.
91. Araujo, supra note 81, at 71.
92. See Outzs, supra note 82, at 307 ("Under the plain-meaning rule, one looks
first to the text. If it is perceived by the judge to be clear, the inquiry ends."); Gene R.
Shreve, Symmetries of Access in Civil Rights Litigation: Politics, Pragmatism & Will, 66
IND. L.J. 1,7-8 (1990) ("The plain meaning rule, which provides that a statute be inter
preted according to the plain or ordinary meaning of its language, continues to exert
influence. ").
93. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 71-72.
94. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Labor v. Elledge, 614 F.2d 247, 250 (10th Cir.
1980). But see Clark D. Cunningham et aI., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE
L.J. 1561, 1614 (1994) (exploring the ideas raised in LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LAN
GUAGE OF JUDGES (1993), for example, the idea that linguistic analysis shows that plain
meaning cannot be found in the dictionary).
95. Outzs, supra note 82, at 298 (citation omitted).
96. See Naomi R. Cahn et aI., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contempo
rary Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1754, 1759 (1993) (presenting alternative
analyses to Lon Fuller'S classic article The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 616 (1949)). "The meaning of the language of the statute depends on who is
reading the statute and where she places emphasis as to what different 'plain mean
ing(s)' will emerge." Id. at 1759.
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interpreter's basic assumptions.97
B.

The Textualist Theory of Statutory Interpretation

The textualist theory of statutory interpretation, like the plain
meaning rule, focuses on the statute and does not consider legisla
tive history or other sources to resolve conflict or ambiguity.98
However, unlike the plain meaning rule, a textualist interpretation
will go beyond the particular provision and look at the entire stat
ute to arrive at an interpretation. 99
Textualism is distrustful of the use of legislative history in stat
utory interpretation and the ambiguities it creates.1°o Rather, tex
tualism views statutes as "'one-time pronouncements of an
independent Congress, binding so far as they impose a meaning, but
not instructive, not illuminated either by their political history or by
the course of their implementation. "'101
Although more complex in its approach than the plain mean
ing rule, textualist theory poses a similar problem as the plain
meaning rule by being overly simplistic, static, and by failing to rec
ognize that the meaning one gives to words is largely determined by
context. 102 As Professor Eskridge has stated, one inherent problem
of the textualist method is that "interpretation cannot aspire to uni
versal objectivity, since the interpreter's perspective will always in
97. See, e.g., Cahn et aI., supra note 96, at 1759-60. "[W]e must instead recognize
that law and facts are intertwined, and that how we view the facts is influenced by how
we view the law." Id. at 1760.
Another problem with the plain meaning rule is that Congress often intentionally
leaves a statute's language ambiguous in an effort to include currently unimagined po
tential applications. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 347; see also Susan G.
Fentin, Note, The False Claims Act-Finding Middle Ground Between Opportunity and
Opportunism: The "Original Source" Provision of 31 U.S.c. § 3730(e) (4) , 17 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 255, 286 (1995) (arguing against the use of the plain meaning rule with
ambiguous statutes and, instead, advocating the use of fundamental principles of statu
tory construction to interpret an ambiguous statute).
98. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 73.
99. See id.
100. See Outzs, supra note 82, at 307. The basis for this distrust is twofold. First,
the use of legislative histories or other sources is seen as violating the democratic sys
tem established through the doctrine of separation of powers. Second, the use of these
sources expands the powers of interest groups by emphasizing the deals they made with
Congress. See id. (citing Nicholas Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of
Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295,
1300-08 (1990)).
101. Outzs, supra note 82, at 308 (quoting an unpublished manuscript of Peter L.
Strauss, Fighting the Common Law Function of Courts, 1994 SUP. Cr. REv. 61 (1995)).
102. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 342-43.
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teract with the text and historical context."103 Additionally,
textualism, like the plain meaning rule, errs in presupposing that
language is intrinsically determinate. 104
C.

The Intentionalist Theory of Statutory Interpretation

The intentionalist theory of statutory interpretation is based on
the notion that a statute by nature is more general than specific,
giving the statute greater effectiveness in a broader range of cir
cumstances. lOS However, statutes are not enacted in a vacuum.
Most often, statutes are enacted with a general policy framework. 106
To this end, intentionalism examines the" 'intent of the legislature'
in enacting the statute."107 Under this view, the court "acts as the
enacting legislature's faithful servant, discovering and applying the
legislature's original intent."!08 As an agent of the legislature, the
court's role is limited to discovering and applying the legislature's
intent to a particular factual context,l°9
Various tools may be used by advocates of this position to ad
dress the issue of Congress's intent, including the legislative his
tory.110 The use of legislative history is especially necessary in
determining why a particular word or phrase was added. 111 Inten
tionalism, thus, is limited in effect because it disregards subsequent
historical developments or the changing societal context. 112 How
ever, intentionalist theory seeks to find what the general intent of
the legislature was and apply that intent to the situation at hand,
not to discover the specific intent of particular legislators,u3
D. A Feminist Theory of Statutory Interpretation 114

There is no single feminist approach to statutory interpret a
Id. at 343 (citation omitted).
See id. at 341. Professor Eskridge suggests that the nature of language as
determinate or indeterminate is a point of departure among theorists. To highlight the
debate he discusses the multiple layers of meaning in the word "discrimination."
105. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 85. "By necessity, statutes, in order to remain
operational and effective, must be general and must retain flexibility in their language
so they can address any unforeseen circumstances." Id.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 81.
108: Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 325.
109. See id. at 325-26.
110. See Outzs, supra note 82, at 309.
111. See id. at 309.
112. See id. at 310.
113. See id.
114. There are other methods of statutory interpretation that might also reveal
103.

104.
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tion.1 15 In fact, as Professor Bartlett points out, suggesting a
uniquely feminist interpretive method is inherently problematic.
"[The] use of the label 'feminist' has contributed to a tendency
within feminism to assume a definition of 'woman' or a standard for
'women's experiences' that is fixed, exclusionary, homogenizing,
and oppositional, a tendency that feminists have criticized in
others."1l6 However, one characteristic common to a feminist ap
proach to statutory interpretation, unlike the traditional ap
proaches, is that "[f]eminists have called attention to the
importance of identifying and using traditionally obscured perspec
tives to expose hidden bias and to develop new interpretations. "117
For instance, feminists have challenged the presumption that
the judicial role in statutory interpretation is or can be neutral. 118
In particular, as Professor Resnik has noted, the feminist critique
often begins with the notion that courts have employed the tradi
tional methods of statutory interpretation under a misguided notion
of judicial objectivity.119 Feminists have challenged the classical
view of a judicial role where" 'judges are not supposed to have an
involvement or interest in the controversies they adjudicate. Disen
gagement and dispassion supposedly enable judges to decide cases
fairly and impartially. "'120 Rather, feminist analysis suggests that in
practice disengagement is not followed, and that in theory the tradi
tional view of statutory interpretation is not something to which we
should aspire. 121 A feminist theory of statutory interpretation rethe policy tensions evident in the Act. See, for example, Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 14, for other theories of statutory interpretation that might reveal the policy
tensions evident in the FLSA. See infra Part III.D for a more thorough discussion of
the relevance of a feminist policy-centered analysis to the issue of interpreting the 1972
amendment to the FLSA.
115. See Cahn et aI., supra note 96, at 1756; see also A. Yasmine Rassam,
"Mother," "Parent," and Bias, 69 IND. L.J. 1165 (1994) ("Contemporary scholars do not
share a single ideological approach to feminist jurisprudence." (citations omitted».
116. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 834
(1990) (citation omitted). In this article, Professor Bartlett establishes the feminist
stance of positionality and advocates that feminist methods are ends in themselves. See
id.
117. Cahn et aI., supra note 96, at 1757.
118. See generally Judith Resnik, On the Bias; Feminist Reconsiderations of the
Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988) (advocating that the classi
cal theory that judges are to be unbiased, impartial, and objective is not theoretically or
practically precise).
119. See id. at 1882.
120. Id. (quoting Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376
(1982».
121. See id.
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places this traditional view of the judicial role as the objective inter
preter with the notion that the interpreter necessarily has
involvement in the issues. Thus, once we understand that there is
no position of objectivity, but only a series of perspectives, we learn
that "[t]here is no neutrality, no escape from choice."122
Therefore, feminist approaches to statutory interpretation
principally challenge the notion of the objectivity of the inter
preter. 123 Feminist methods suggest that judges, because of their
particular race, gender, and economic circumstances, interpret stat
utes from a very specific "lens" that should be acknowledged. 124 In
this way, feminist legal scholars argue that language, and thus
meaning, is constructed and is not an objective truth one can simply
uncover.125 Thus, interpretation of a statute from a feminist per
spective might allow the experience of exclusion to influence the
analysis. Using the experience of exclusion, a feminist analysis may
simply but fundamentally alter the starting point of the interpreta
tion of a statute.
A feminist analysis is particularly relevant to the statutory in
terpretation of which businesses are defined as "preschools" and,
therefore, required to comply with the FLSA. The feminist ap
proach is relevant to determine which businesses fall within the def
inition of "preschool" because it involves two areas that have been
traditionally dominated by women, and which disproportionately
affect women's opportunities to participate equally in the economy.
Specifically, the labor force for day care centers and "preschools" is
predominately composed of women,126 and the affordability of day
care disproportionately affects all womens' ability to work outside
122. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engen
dered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 70 (1987) (advocating that the illusion of objectivity is
effectively threatening the prospect of justice).
123. See generally id. at 57; Rassam, supra note 115, at 1170-73.
124. See generally Resnik, supra note 118, at 1906.
125. See Bartlett, supra note 116, at 849. Other legal scholars have also criticized
the notion that language can be "plain" in its meaning. See Rassam, supra note 115, at
1169-71. But see Christian Zapf & Eben Moglen, Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule
of Law: On the Perils of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein, 84 GEO. L.J. 485, 485 (1996)
(asserting that the advocates of linguistic indeterminacy are wrong in their reliance on
Wittgenstein to support their position).
126. In 1995, the number of child care workers (undefined) that were women was
223,000, compared to 20,000 men. Also in 1995, the number of pre-kindergarten and
kindergarten teachers that were women was 489,000, compared to 9,000 men. See Bu
reau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Employed & Experienced Unemployed Per
sons Detailed by Occupation, Sex, Race & Hispanic Origin, Annual Average, 1995,
tbl.1 (1995) (unpublished tables) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bureau of Labor
Statistics]; see also William Goodman, Boom in Day Care Industry the Result of Many
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the home. 127 Thus, a feminist analysis, because it uses the experi
ence of exclusion in its interpretation, provides a starting point for
departure from the three traditional approaches to statutory inter
pretation employed by federal courts in interpreting the 1972
amendment to the FLSA.
Confronting the vague and ambiguous 1972 amendment to the
FLSA, federal courts have struggled to decide whether centers that
care for children under the age that children traditionally enter
school are required to comply with the FLSA's wage and hour re
quirements. In this effort, the courts have used traditional methods
of statutory interpretation borrowing from the plain meaning
rule,128 textualism 129 and intentionalism130 to interpret the 1972
amendment to the FLSA. However, no court exclusively uses one
approach to statutory interpretation. Instead, each court combines
these approaches, shifting from one to another to arrive at its con
clusion. In the following section, this Note will discuss the ap
proaches courts employ to interpret the 1972 amendment to the
FLSA.
III.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF WHETHER A CHILD DAY CARE
CENTER IS A COVERED ENTERPRISE UNDER THE

1972

A.

AMENDMENT

The Fair Labor Standards Act Does Not Apply
Care Centers: Marshall v. Rosemont, Inc. 131

to

Child Day

The Secretary of Labor, in Marshall v. Rosemont, Inc., brought
two actions pursuant to his power under the FLSA132 to enjoin two
day care centers from violating the minimum wage and maximum
Social Changes, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 1995, at 3 (discussing various social changes
that have resulted in the need for increased day care providers).
127. For instance, a study of 158,000 AFDC recipients in Illinois found that 91 %
of parents who were not working would prefer to be working if they had child care that
they liked and trusted. See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID, CHILD CARE:
AFDC RECIPIENTS IN ILLINOIS (1991) [hereinafter ILLINOIS DEP'T OF PUBLIC AID RE
PORT]; see also Catherine L. Fisk, Employer-Provided Child Care Under Title VII: To
ward an Employer's Duty to Accommodate Child Care Responsibilities of Employees, 2
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 89 (1986) ("Motherhood ... is ... one of the most persis
tent impediments to economic equality for women .... [Women] experience a variety of
adverse employment consequences because of their conflicting responsibilities to their
children. ").
128. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the plain meaning rule.
129. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of textualism.
130. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of intentionalism.
131. 584 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1978).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1994).
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hour provisions of the Act,133 In one center the children ranged in
age from infancy to kindergarten. In the other center, the children
ranged from infancy to third grade. 134 The Secretary claimed the
enterprises at issue were "preschools" within the definition of cov
ered enterprises. 135 In support of this assertion, the Secretary relied
upon a Wage and Hour Opinion Letter136 that, in the absence of
congressional direction, defined the term "preschool" broadly.1 37
The district court held that neither of the defendant's day care cen
ters were operating a preschool within the meaning of the Act and
both complaints were dismissed. 138 The Secretary of Labor
appealed. 139
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af
firmed the district court's decision. 140 Relying on textualist meth
ods of interpretation, the Ninth Circuit first looked to the statute
and analyzed the word "preschool" within the context of the defini
tion of enterprise. 141 The court recognized that Congress, in devel
oping the particular types of institutions within the Act, added
"preschool" to a long list of other types of schools.142 The court
concluded that Congress, therefore, used the term "preschool" to
133. See Rosemont, 584 F.2d at 320.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. This is an administrative ruling promulgated by the Wages-Hours Adminis
trator. Opinion letters are written under a variety of circumstances. In this case, the
letter was a response to a resolution to clarify the Wages-Hours law (the Chief of the
Branch of Coverage and Exemptions in the Wage and Hour Division proposed this
resolution). See Opinion Letter of the Wage-Hour Administrator, No. 1346, [June
1973-Sept. 1978 Transfer Binder, Wages-Hours Administrative Rulings] Lab. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'II 30,953 (October 24, 1974) [hereinafter Opinion Letter No. 1346].
137. See id. This letter discusses the history of the FLSA, in particular the legisla
tive activity leading to the inclusion of "preschool." Coverage was extended to include
"preschool" regardless of the dollar volume of business or their public or private na
ture, so long as it has employees engaged in commerce, or the production of goods for
commerce. See id. Additionally, the letter defined the term "preschool" as including:
[A]ny establishment or institution which accepts for enrollment children of
preschool age for purposes of providing custodial, educational, or develop
mental services designed to prepare the children for school in the years before
they enter the elementary school grades. This includes day care centers, nurs
ery schools, kindergartens, head start programs and any similar facility primar
ily engaged in the care and protection of preschool children.

Id.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See
See
See
See
See

Rosemont, 584 F.2d at 320.
id.
id. at 322.
id. at 321.
id.
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mean an enterprise that is part of the school system. 143 Thus, in
interpreting the Act, the Ninth Circuit focused upon the educa
tional nature of a "preschool."144 By inference, child day care cen
ters were thus custodial in nature.
Again relying on textualist methods of interpretation, the court
also reviewed Congress's definitions of "elementary" and "secon
dary" school, which were covered under the same provision in the
ACt. 145 Because the Act defers to state law in the definition of ele
mentary and secondary schools,l46 the court concluded that state
law was relevant in determining whether a child day care center was
a "preschool" within the meaning of the 1972 amendment. 147 Thus,
because the day care centers were not regulated by the state of Ari
zona, and because the Secretary did not present any conclusive evi
dence that these institutions should be considered an enterprise, the
court held that the FLSA did not apply to these day care centers. 148

143. See id. "Of 'schools' [the Act] lists schools for 'handicapped or gifted chil
dren'; it then proceeds to 'a preschool, elementary or secondary school, or institution of
higher education.'" [d.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 320-21.
146. See id.; see also Smith v. Friends of Children, 616 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Miss.
1985). The Smith court advocated a similar reasoning as the court in Rosemont: Since
within the Act deference is given to state law in defining "elementary" and "secondary"
school, because the Act defers to state law in defining each term, by inference, state law
is determinative in defining "preschool." See id. at 183. See supra notes 67 and 68 for
the definitions of "elementary" and "secondary" schools. Thus, since the Head Start
program was not certified by the State Department of Education, the court held that it
was not operating a preschool within the meaning of the FLSA. See Smith, 616 F. Supp.
at 183.
147. See Rosemont, 584 F.2d at 321. Similarly, in Satya! v. Shah, 756 F. Supp. 937
(E.D. Va. 1991), the plaintiff, a live-in day care worker, filed suit seeking minimum
wage and overtime pay under the FLSA. See id. at 938. The Satya! court, like the court
in Rosemont, concluded that the day care center was not an enterprise covered under
the Act. See id. at 941. As did the court in Rosemont, the Satya! court reviewed the
statute's treatment of "elementary" and "secondary" schools. The court held that the
FLSA deferred to state law concerning the definition of "elementary" and "secondary"
schools but failed to do this with "preschool." The Satya! court, however, unlike the
court in Rosemont, concluded that state law should not be the point of distinction, be
cause Congress chose to omit any reference to state law and presumably would have
included such a reference had it been important. See id. at 939.
148. See Rosemont, 584 F.2d at 321-22.
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Centers
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to
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Child Day Care

United States Department of Labor v. Elledge 149

In United States Department of Labor v. Elledge, the Secretary
of Labor appealed a judgment by the lower court holding that the
day care center was not a "preschool" within the meaning of the
Act. 150 The "Young Sooners Day Care Center" was open to chil
dren ranging in age from infancy to twelve years.1 51 Sixty-two per
cent of the children were three to five years 01d. 152 The center
transported children of school age to and from their schools and
provided them with games, toys, activities, books, and food for
snacks and meals while at the center. The center provided the same
sort of activities for the children who were not school age with the
addition of naps.153
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit first
relied on intentionalist methods of statutory interpretation to ana
lyze the meaning of "preschool" within the Act by reviewing the
history of the FLSA, and particularly the evolution of the definition
of "enterprise" and the definitions of "elementary" and "secon
dary" schools. 154 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the legislative
history leading to the 19?2 amendment was unhelpful.1 55 Turning
then to Oklahoma law, the court recognized that the state had li
censed the center as a "day care center."156 Under this Oklahoma
statute, a day care center was defined as a "'facility which provides
care and protection of six or more children for part of the twenty
four hour day."'157 Additionally, the statute excluded from its
149. 614 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1980).
150. See id. at 248. The Secretary of Labor instituted the action for declaratory
judgment on the issue of whether the enterprise was a preschool covered under the
FLSA. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id. No statistics were given for the age breakdown of the other 38% of
the children.
153. See id. at 249.
154. See id. See supra notes 67 and 68 for the definition of "elementary" and
"secondary" school.
155. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 249. The court found that the only reference to the
1972 amendment was in H.R. REP. No. 92-1085, at 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2567. This merely notes the addition of" 'preschool' to the existing
listing of 'an elementary or secondary school' as types of activities performed for busi
ness purposes." Elledge, 614 F.2d at 249.
156. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 249.
157. Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 402(d) (no date provided by the court)).
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scope all facilities that were educational in purpose.1 5S These ex
cluded facilities which were registered through the state board of
education, included nursery schools, kindergartens, elementary, and
secondary schools. 159
The court in Elledge rejected the conclusion in Rosemont that
a "preschool" should be distinguished from a day care center on the
grounds that the former serves a primarily educational function
while the latter provides only a function of custodial care. 160 The
Elledge court held that this was an artificial distinction, because the
relevant section of the FLSA relates to enterprises with primarily a
custodial function as well as those with primarily an educational
function. 161 As additional support for this conclusion, the Tenth
Circuit turned to an earlier Tenth Circuit decision, McComb v.
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. 162 In McComb, the court held
that the FLSA "is not expanded to include some employees and
limited to exclude others engaged in the same work, depending
upon local statutory or judicial concepts. "163 The Tenth Circuit
held that this principle is controlling unless Congress makes state
law applicable.1 64 Thus, the Tenth Circuit highlighted one of the
original purposes of the Act: to provide uniformity in the treatment
of workers. 165
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 249-50.
161. See id. at 250.
162. 167 F.2d 911. modified and afrd, 337 U.S. 755 (1949). In McComb, the
Tenth Circuit addressed whether all of the defendant's employees, except one, were
engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce under the agriculture
provisions of the Act. See id. at 912. The action in McComb was brought before the
"enterprise concept" was introduced into the Act. Thus, the Secretary had to prove
that each employee was engaged in commerce or the production of goods for com
merce. In this context, the court concluded that "local law relating to the imposition of
special assessments or the levying of ad valorem taxes is not the test for determining
whether the employees of such a corporation are engaged in agriculture within the
meaning of [the] section." Id. at 915. To do this would be to "introduce [as many]
variations ... as the laws of the several states." Id. The court, therefore, concluded
that under the Act, "[p]ersons engaged in identical work [cannot] be within the statute
or exempt from its provisions depending upon the location of their work and the atti
tude of the particular state." Id. See supra note 26 for the text of the 1938 version of 29
U.S.c. § 206(a)(I)-(3) (1994); see also supra Part I.A for a discussion of the 1938 enact
ment of the FLSA.
163. McComb, 167 F.2d at 915 (citing National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. III (1944».
164. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250.
165. See supra Part I.A for a thorough discussion of Congress's intent in enacting
the FLSA.
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Shifting to the text, the court analyzed the Act's deference to
state law in the definitions of "elementary" and "secondary" school
relative to the absence of state law in defining "preschool."166 The
Tenth Circuit, in contrast to Rosemont, held that because Congress
specifically allows states to substantively define "elementary" and
"secondary" school,167 and conversely fails to refer to state law with
"preschool," Congress intended to treat "preschools" differently.168
N ext, the court employed the plain meaning rule and reasoned
that, in the absence of direction from Congress and in the absence
of legislative history, "'it is appropriate for the court to interpret
[preschool] in accordance with its ordinary, everyday meaning."'169
The court then turned to Webster's definition of "preschool," which
was defined as "'a kindergarten or nursery school where children of
preschool age, sometimes in age groups, are entered for observa
tion and social and educational training."'17o The court noted that
this definition was consistent with a Wage and Hour Opinion Letter
issued by the Department of Labor, which does not make a distinc
tion between the custodial and educational functions of "preschool"
and day care centers,171
The Tenth Circuit, in concluding that the "Young Sooners Day
Care Center" was a covered enterprise under the Act,l72 cited the
remedial and humanitarian intent of the Act as addressing the det
rimental circumstances of many workers. 173 The Tenth Circuit
noted that the Act, as a remedial and humanitarian statute, has
been interpreted to reach the furthest coverage "'consistent with
congressional direction."'174 Similarly, to effectuate its remedial
166. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250.
167. See supra notes 67 and 68 for the definitions of "elementary" and "secon
dary" schools under the FLSA.
168. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250.
169. Id. (quoting United States v. New Mexico, 536 F.2d 1324, 1327-28 (10th Cir.
1976)).
170. Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC
TIONARY (2d ed.) (no date provided by the court)).
171. See id. at 251; see supra note 137 for the text of the letter.
172. Elledge, 614 F.2d at 251.
173. See id.; see also Hodgson v. University Club Tower, Inc., 466 F.2d 745, 746
(10th Cir. 1972) (indicating that the FLSA was passed for humanitarian and remedial
purposes). The Act itself lends this interpretation. Section 216 of the Act provides
penalties for knowing violations of the Act. See 29 U.S.c. § 216 (1994). This demon
strates the Act's remedial nature. Additionally, the humanitarian purpose is clearly
stated in the declared policy of the Act to "correct and as rapidly as practicable to
eliminate the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially cur
tailing employment or earning power." 29 U.S.c. § 202(b) (1994).
174. Elledge, 614 F.2d at 251 (quoting Mitchell v. Lubin, McGaughy & Assoc.,
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and humanitarian purpose, the Act's breadth of coverage has his
torically been viewed as vital to the Act's mission,175 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit reasoned that categorizing the plaintiff's day care
center as a "preschool" is consistent not only with Congress's intent
with regard to the 1972 amendment, but also with the Act as a
whole. 176
2.

Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Center 177

In Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Center, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also addressed the issue of
when afacility that cares for children below the compulsory school
age becomes a "preschool" within the meaning of the Act,178 Miss
Paula's Day Care Center provided custodial care in the Appalach
ian region of southeastern Ohio for over sixty children ranging in
age from infants to six year 01ds,179 Even though Ohio has a sepa
rate license for "preschool," the center had never sought this li
cense,180 but had been a state-licensed day care center since 1985. 181
The district court, rejecting the center's argument that the distinc
tion between a day care center and "preschool" lies in the nature of
the institution,182 held that the center came within the meaning of
the Act because the common sense definition of a "preschool" in
cludes a day care center. 183 The center appealed. 184
The Sixth Circuit looked to the language of the statute as well
as the surrounding provisions concerning the definition of "elemen
tary" and "secondary" schoo1. 185 The court interpreted the 1972
amendment, which included "preschool" in the list of covered en
358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (holding that the Act should be liberally construed to its fur
thest reaches, consistent with congressional direction».
175. See id. (citing Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 516
(1950».
176. See id.
177. 37 F.3d 1191 (6th Cir. 1994).
178. See id. at 1192.

179. See id.
180. See id.; see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.646 (Banks-Baldwin 1994). "Pre
school program" is defined as "a child day care program for preschool children."
§ 3301.52(A).
181. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1192. The center was licensed under OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 5104.01-.03 (Banks-Baldwin 1984).
182. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1195. To this end, the center argued that day
care centers are primarily .custodial, and "preschools," as the name suggests, are primar
ily educational. See id.

183. See id.
184. See id. at 1192.
185. See id. at 1193-94.
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terprises, within the context of the 1966 amendment which ex
panded the "enterprise concept."186 The court noted that in
amending the FLSA in 1966 to include elementary and secondary
schools as covered enterprises, Congress expressed concern over
the impact an increase in wages would have on school district budg
ets.187 However, despite this concern, Congress included elemen
tary and secondary schools as covered enterprises under the Act.
From these historical facts, the court inferred that Congress know
ingly decided that the extension of the FLSA to these employees
outweighed the financial burden it would impose on the school sys
tems. 188 The court held that it was reasonable to infer from the
House Report that "'preschool[s]'" were added to the Act because
of the economic characteristics they share with elementary and sec
ondary schools. 189 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit held that the finan
cial strains of compliance with the Act were not intended by
Congress to be considered in determining coverage under the
Act.1 90 Despite this analysis, the court ultimately concluded that
the legislative history was unhelpful in interpreting the 1972
amendment. 191
The Sixth Circuit next recognized the distinction that other
courts, based on the text of the statute, had made between the sup
posed custodial nature of day care centers and the educational na
ture of "preschools."192 The Sixth Circuit, however, held that this
was a strained reading of the statute because the Act included tradi
tionally custodial institutions, such as hospitals, as well as tradition
ally educational institutions like secondary schools. 193
The Sixth Circuit employed the plain meaning rule to reach its
conclusion that the center was a "preschool" within the meaning of
the Act. 194 The court held that it was reasonable that Congress did
not provide for "child day care centers" separately, because it re
186. See id. at 1194.
187. See id. at 1193 n.4 (citing S. REp. No. 89-1487, at 8 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 3010).
188. See id.
189. Id. at 1194 (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-554, at 5-6 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2567).
190. See id. at 1193.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 1194-95. This had been the center's primary support for its argu
ment that it should not fall within the FLSA's umbrella. See also Marshall v.
Rosemont, 584 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1978).
193. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1195. The court noted this reading assumes
more than the statute's words suggest. See id.
194. See id.
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garded them in their common language meaning as serving any
child who is before or "pre" school age.1 95 Additionally, the court
held that even under a state law definition, the "plain meaning" of
"preschool" would include child day care centers like Miss Paula's,
because even though the state of Ohio licenses "preschools" and
"day care centers" differently, Ohio's definition of preschools in
cludes "day care" programs. 196 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit held
that even if Miss Paula's could show it provided no education to the
children and was merely a custodial center, Miss Paula's would still
be obligated to comply with the FLSA because the statute includes
purely custodial institutions. 197
The Sixth Circuit was reluctant to end its inquiry with the stat
utory interpretation of the 1972 amendment. Rather, the court
noted the conflict in policies when it recognized that the facts of the
case were disturbing because Miss Paula's provided educational en
richment to low-income children while their parents were produc
tive members of the work force. 198 The Sixth Circuit further noted
that, as the facts indicated, the requirements of the FLSA placed a
severe burden on Miss Paula's and thus on the childrens' parents. 199
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit inferred that even though this deci
sion may have an adverse effect, if it is the government's social pol
icy to eliminate low wage operations, the court was not allowed to
stand in its way, for this was a legislative and not a judicial func
tion. 2DD As further support for this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
commented that to exempt day care centers from the FLSA's mini
mum wage and overtime provisions would be to encourage centers
to "dumb down" their programs in an effort to avoid the extra fi
nancial burden.2Dl

195. Id.
196. Id. This was the magistrate judge's interpretation of this part of Ohio's stat
ute, which the court accepted. See id.; see supra notes 180 and 181 for citation to
Ohio's statutes.
197. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1196. The court noted the precarious position of
. the center. At one end of the Act, educational institutions are required to comply, and
at the other end, purely custodial profeSSional babysitting services must also comply.
See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1994) for exemptions of casual babysitting
services.
198. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1197.
199. See id.
200. See id. Additionally, the court noted that it may be Congress's intent to
eliminate low-cost operations like Miss Paula's. See id.
.
201. See id.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

Defining the scope of coverage under the FLSA has been a
fundamental point of legislative and judicial disagreement since the
Act's inception. 202 As the courts in Miss Paula's, Elledge, and
Rosemont concluded, the legislative history of the 1972 amend
ment, which added "preschool" to the list of covered enterprises,
was unhelpful in determining the scope of coverage under the 1972
amendment. 203 Senate and House Reports, as well as the Congres
sional Record, are frustratingly void of reference to Congress's rea
soning in amending the FLSA to include "preschool" in its
treatment of covered enterprises. 204 .
The only insight into congressional intent in amending the
FLSA to include "preschool" is in the language of the 1972 amend
ment itself. However, that amendment simply adds "preschool" to
the existing list of "activities performed for business purposes."205
Therefore, because the definition of "preschool" is left without leg
islative direction, the courts charged with defining its import have
employed a variety of interpretive methods.
In interpreting the 1972 amendment, the courts have used
traditional approaches to statutory interpretation. These ap
proaches include the plain meaning rule, and methods consistent
with intentionalism and textualism. No court uses one approach ex
clusively. Instead, each court combines different approaches to ar
rive at its conclusion. Additionally, no court has substantively
considered the policy of the Act as an anti-poverty provision. In
stead, the only court to address policy issues concluded that consid
eration of public policy issues was not a judicial function. 206
This analysis will address the difficulties courts have faced in
interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA. This Note asserts
202. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding that the 1961 amend·
ment introducing the "enterprise" concept is constitutional), overruled on other grounds
by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Walling v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943) (holding the FLSA's Commerce Clause base to be con·
stitutional); see also Willis, supra note 28, at 609 (commenting that although the FLSA
has been in existence since 1938, and most of its terms are clear, litigation concerning
coverage continued to be greater than any other labor law well into the 1970s).
203. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1193; United States Dep't of Labor v. Elledge,
614 F.2d 247, 249 (10th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Rosemont, 584 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir.
1978).
204. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 92-554, at 5-6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.AN.
2462,2467.
205. Id. at 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2462.
206. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1197. For a more thorough discussion of Miss
Paula's, see supra Part II1.B.2.
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that the traditional approaches employed by federal courts in inter
preting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA fail under the weight of
an issue that is inextricably entwined with public policy. Further,
the approaches to interpretation used by the federal courts, without
consideration of public policy issues, allow justification of decisions
based on reasons unrelated to the purpose of the statute. Thus, the
interpretive methods used by federal courts neither provide effi
cient and consistent analysis, nor substantively address inconsisten
cies within the Act.
After examining the courts' methods of interpreting the 1972
amendment, this Note concludes that a policy-centered method is
the only effective analysis for courts to employ.207 A feminist pol
icy-centered method highlights how traditional methods have failed
to address the adverse impact on low-income women that results
from either a broad or narrow interpretation of the 1972 amend
ment to the FLSA. Thus, this feminist analysis forms the starting
point of a policy-centered analysis. Further, a policy-centered anal
ysis, founded on feminist concerns, leads to greater judicial honesty
concerning the nature of the problems that emerge in interpreting
the 1972 amendment to the FLSA.
This Note advocates that courts should not disregard policy as
beyond the purview of the judiciary. Instead, courts should weigh
the public policy issues in order to fill the legislative void left by
Congress when it failed to define "preschool" in the 1972 amend
ment to the FLSA. Furthermore, courts should practice judicial
honesty and, where the Act's omissions result in injustice, discuss
policy in their opinions. This Note concludes that what the Sixth
Circuit in Miss Paula's deemed beyond the role of the judiciary, is
fundamental to the proper administration of justice.
A.

The Plain Meaning of "Preschool" is Inconclusive

The court in Miss Paula's and Elledge employed the plain
meaning rule in their interpretation of the 1972 amendment. 208 In
207. While other analytical methods of statutory construction consider policy is
sues, this Note advocates a policy-centered analysis, founded on feminist concerns. A
practical reasoning method of statutory interpretation would employ the policy of the
Act in its interpretive process. For a thorough discussion of practical reasoning, see
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14; see also Michael D. Blanchard, Note, Interpreting
Section 541(a) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992: A Presumption in Favor of Practical Reason, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 458-85
(1996).
208. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1195; Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250; see also supra
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Elledge, the Tenth Circuit relied on the plain meaning rule after
exhausting other interpretive methods. 209 Using the plain meaning
rule as a method of last resort suggests that the court found a plain
meaning in the text rather than addressing the ambiguity of the
text. 210
As support for its "plain meaning" that a child day care center
is a "preschool" within the meaning of the Act, the court in Elledge
relied on the dictionary.211 The court used Webster's New Interna
tional Dictionary, second edition ("Webster's"), as clear support for
its position. 212 In Webster's, preschool is defined as "'a kindergar
ten or nursery school where children of preschool age, sometimes in
age groups, are entered for observation and social and educational
training. "'213
The problem with using a dictionary as a source for the plain
meaning of a word is that it does not define the term according to
the statute, but instead defines the term according to one particular
usage of a word. For instance, had the court in Elledge used the
American Heritage Dictionary, second edition, the definition would
have read: "Of, pertaining to, or designed for a child of nursery
school age. "214 This definition, unlike that of Webster's, does not
support the court's conclusion. Thus, although appearing self-evi
dent, the court's use of the plain meaning rule in Elledge gives the
false impression that the statute has one clear meaning. 215
Similarly, the court in Miss Paula's employed the plain mean
ing rule when it held that the absence of a statutory definition for
"preschool" may be the result of Congress considering day care
centers as part of the" 'preschool' rubric."216 Thus, the court inPart Il.A for a discussion of the plain meaning rule; Shreve, supra note 92, at 7-8 (the
plain meaning rule continues to exert influence over judicial decisionmaking).
209. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250 (the Tenth Circuit first employed a textualist
method of interpretation and turned to a plain meaning method after concluding the
textualist method was inconclusive).
210. See Outzs, supra note 82, at 298 (citing Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Ad
ministrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995». Furthermore, the court's use of the
plain meaning rule at the end of its analysis shows that it artificially imposed a plain
meaning on a statute that really was ambiguous. See id.
211. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250.
212. See id.
213. Id. (no citation to Webster's New International Dictionary, second edition,
was provided by the court).
214. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 542 (2d ed. 1983).
215. See Cunningham et aI., supra note 94, at 1614-17 (suggesting that linguistic
analysis shows why "plain meaning" cannot be found in the dictionary).
216. Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191, 1195 (6th Cir. 1994).
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ferred that the preschool rubric was clear. However, this interpre
tation of the plain meaning of "preschool" is likewise inconclusive
because it begs the question and fails to address the ambiguity in
the term. 217
For instance, rather than seeing day care centers as part of the
"'preschool' rubric," it is equally plausible that, in 1972, Congress
did not address the issue of whether a child day care center was to
be considered a "preschool," because Congress either was not
aware of the distinction, or the distinction did not exist because day
care centers were not common. Thus, a modern interpreter might
be similarly unaware of the distinction between preschools and day
care centers. Therefore, the "plain meaning" of "preschool" could
suggest a more literal interpretation, applying only to enterprises
with the word "preschool" in the name.
In interpreting the meaning of "preschool," use of the plain
meaning rule allows the interpreter to rest upon her presumptions,
rather than forcing her to challenge them. These presumptions are
problematic because, as Professor Resnik suggests, "what has been
assumed (by some) as a universal viewpoint is, in fact, a viewpoint
of some men, who have articulated a vision of reality and claimed it
to be true for us all."218 Thus, the plain meaning rule is ultimately
inconclusive in interpreting which businesses are considered to be a
"preschool" within the meaning of the Act.
B.

The Use of Textualism is Ineffectual

In interpreting the meaning of "preschool" in the 1972 amend
ment to the FLSA, courts most extensively relied upon methods
consistent with textualism. 219 In Rosemont, the Ninth Circuit em
ployed a textualist method in two ways. First, the court reviewed
where the word "preschool" was introduced in the relevant sections
of the Act.220 Noting that "preschool" was among a list of other
types of schools, the court in Rosemont concluded that a "pre
217. For instance, if day care centers were part of everyday experience, then the
absence of the inclusion of "day care center" would lead to the conclusion that Con
gress did not intend to include day care centers as covered under the 1972 amendment
to the FLSA. By contrast, if day care centers were not common in 1972, Congress
reasonably would not have known of them, so the absence of day care centers in the
1972 amendment would not mean that Congress did not intend to include them.
218. Resnik, supra note 118, at 1906.
219. See supra Part n.B for a discussion of the textualist theory of statutory
interpretation.
220. See Marshall v. Rosemont, 584 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1978).
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school" is a part of the school system.221 Second, upon deciding
that a preschool is part of the school system, the court looked to the
definitions of "elementary" and "secondary" school.222 Finding
that in these definitions the Act deferred to state law, the court
concluded that state law is also determinative in interpreting a
"preschool. "223
The Tenth Circuit in Elledge also employed textualist methods
of interpretation similar in process, if not in result, with the court's
method in Rosemont. The Elledge court also began its analysis by
looking to the sections of the Act where the word "preschool" was
added. 224 However, the Elledge court specifically rejected the con
clusion reached in Rosemont. 225 Instead, the Tenth Circuit held
that, because Congress specifically allowed states to substantively
define "elementary" and "secondary" school,226 and conversely
failed to refer to state law with "preschool," Congress intended to
treat "preschools" differently.227 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the Rosemont court's textual interpretation that the
distinguishing feature of a "preschool" is its primarily educational
function in contrast to the custodial nature of a day care center. 228
Rejecting this textual interpretation, the court in Elledge held that
the relevant section of the statute relates to enterprises with a pri
marily custodial function as well as those with primarily an educa
tional function. 229 Thus, the court held that there is no distinction
in the function of the enterprise. 230
As evidenced by the differing judicial interpretations of the
same language, the textual approach is largely colored by the inter
preter's presumptions. Specifically, in interpreting the 1972 amend
ment, the value the interpreter gives to Congress' silence
determines the textual interpretation of this silence. For instance,
in Elledge, the court weighed silence as a stronger inference of Con
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. The trial court found that there was no guidance in state law con
cerning the tenn "preschool." Therefore, the trial court held hearings to detennine the
definition. See id.
224. See United States Dep't of Labor v. Elledge, 614 F.2d 247, 249 (10th Cir.
1980).
225. See id.
226. See supra notes 67 and 68 for the definitions of "elemc::ntary" and "secon
dary" schools under the FLSA.
227. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250.
228. See id. at 249-50.
229. See id. at 250.
230. See id.
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gress's intent. Thus, in textually interpreting the relevance of the
definitions of "elementary" and "secondary" schools, the court in
Elledge held that the state-law definitions were inapplicable to
"preschool."231 The court in Rosemont, however, was less willing to
interpret Congress's silence as a statement of intent. Thus, in inter
preting the text, the Rosemont court found that an analysis into
state-law definitions of "preschool" was relevant to analyzing the
meaning of "preschool" under the FLSA.232
The textualist approach is ultimately ineffectual as a means of
interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA because the inter
preters' presumptions alter the substantive result of Congress' si
lence in defining the term "preschool" in the 1972 amendment to
the FLSA. Accordingly, textualist approaches fail to provide gui
dance concerning the inclusion of "preschools" as covered enter
prises under the 1972 amendment to the FLSA.
C.

The Intent of Congress in Enacting the FLSA Suggests Broad
Coverage in Favor of the Day Care Center Employee

Each court charged with interpreting the 1972 amendment has
recognized the absence of legislative history concerning the 1972
amendment. 233 However, in interpreting what businesses are cov
ered by the inclusion of "preschool," the court in Elledge and Miss
Paula's moved beyond the 1972 amendment to interpret the
amendment's intent within the Act as a whole. 234
In Miss Paula's, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit employed an intentionalist approach to statutory in
terpretation when it addressed the debate surrounding the inclusion
of "elementary" and "secondary" schools in the 1966 amend
ment. 235 The court noted that the Senate had initially omitted these
institutions due to the concern over the financial impact that mini
mum wage and overtime requirements would have on state school
231. See id.
232. See Marshall v. Rosemont, 584 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1978).
233. See Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191, 1193 (6th Cir. 1994)
("[t]he statute's legislative history casts little light on whether Congress considered cus
todial 'child day care centers' to be 'preschools"'); Elledge, 614 F.2d at 249 ("We find no
legislative history of any help or significance."); Rosemont, 584 F.2d at 320 ("Congress
... left the definition of 'preschool' undefined. Literally, it could apply from babes in
arms to the first classification to be defined thereafter.").
234. See supra Part H.C for a discussion of the intentionalist theory of statutory
interpretation.
235. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1193.
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budgets. 236 Although no record exists concerning why these busi
nesses were ultimately included in the Act, the Sixth Circuit in
ferred that their inclusion meant that Congress believed the
benefits of coverage outweighed the detriment. 237 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that Congress's intent was to extend coverage to
more employees despite potentially adverse economic conse
quences.
. Although the court in Elledge relied heavily on a textualist ap
proach to interpretation as final confirmation for its position that
the child day care center is a "preschool" within the meaning of the
Act, the court found support in the FLSA's larger intent. 238 To this
end, the court in Elledge cited case precedent concerning the Act's
purpose as a remedial and humanitarian statute. 239 Thus, the court
concluded that, where ambiguity exists, this humanitarian intent ad
vises broad coverage in favor of the employee. 24o
The courts in Miss Paula's and Elledge agreed that Congress
intended to extend coverage liberally in favor of the employee. 241
Nevertheless, the intentionalist approach fails because the focus of
its inquiry is too narrow. For instance, while broad coverage in
favor of the employee is consistent with the FLSA's anti-poverty
purpose, this insight alone is insufficient precisely because modem
circumstances affecting poverty have changed while the Act has re
mained constant.242 Thus, as the court in Miss Paula's noted,
although it may be the government's policy to eliminate low wage
operations, complying with the FLSA's minimum wage and over
time requirements may have the effect of placing an unmanageable
burden' on the parents who are themselves low wage workers. 243
Thus, intentionalism, without a policy-centered focus, is ineffec
tual.244
236. See id. at 1193 n.4.
237. See id. The court's reasoning could have been that, rather than a substantive
reason for acquiescence, one chamber may merely have 'acceded to the other. See gen
erally, Outzs; supra note 82, at 301, for a discussion of the legislative process of a statute
from a proposed bill to enactment.
238. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250-51.
239. See id. at 251.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 250-51; Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1197.
242. See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of how modern circumstances affect the
Act's minimum wage and overtime provisions.
243. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1197.
244. See generally' Schreve, supra note 92, at 8. Schreve notes that an additional
problem with ending the interpretive analysis with a review of the intent of Congress is
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D. A Policy-Centered Interpretation, Founded on Feminist
Concerns, Recognizes the Complexity of the Issue
Only the Sixth Circuit in Miss Paula's notes in dicta what might
be considered a policy-centered analysis. However, the Sixth Cir
cuit's use of these observations as a method of interpretation was
restricted by its assumption that discussing the Act's inconsistencies
was a legislative, not judicial, function. Therefore, the court kept its
policy-centered observations from becoming an interpretive
method. Thus, it remains unclear what result a policy-centered in
terpretation of the 1972 amendment to the FLSA might have on the
courts' analysis.
A policy-centered analysis might ask three interrelated ques
tions: 245 first, using traditional methods of interpretation, whether
day care workers are the kind of workers the FLSA was intended to
protect; second, whether the traditional interpretation is consistent
with the purpose of the Act; and third, to the extent that there is a
conflict in policies, how might the judiciary inform the legislature of
the inconsistency in the particular factual context at hand?246
In particular, a policy-centered analysis, focused on feminist
concerns, is a natural starting point to a policy-centered interpreta
tion of the 1972 amendment to the FLSA. For instance, a broad
interpretation of the 1972 amendment results in preschool workers'
wages increasing. However, increased labor costs also will likely
result in the cost of day care rising. The availability of low-cost day
care affects women's ability to work outside the home, particularly
single women, and thus, impacts low-income women's ability to
participate in the economy on an equal basis.247 Similarly, because
that "[i]n reality, ... language discloses only manifest intent-which mayor may not
reflect actual legislative intent." [d.
245. There are numerous ways a feminist analysis might begin to address the
problem of interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA. This is but one way to
construct the analysis ..
246. Feminist statutory interpretation instructs the interpreter's inquiry based on
the notion that "[f]eminist theories share a view that much of women's experiences of
their lives [have] been omitted in the standard scholarly and popular descriptions of the
world." Resnik, supra note 118, at 1906.
247. See Chris Tilly & Randy Albelda, University of Mass. at Boston, It'll Take
More than a Miracle: Income in Single-Mother Families in Massachusetts, 1979-1987
(1992) [hereinafter Tilly & Albelda, Occasional Paper]. This paper outlines why single
mothers failed to experience the benefits of the "Massachusetts Miracle." In this paper
the authors point out that the combination of children, one working-aged adult, and the
adult being female creates a "triple whammy" that significantly depresses the family's
earning power. See id. at 1-2; see also Women in the Workforce in the Year 2000, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), Apr. 13, 1988, available in WESTLAW, BNA-DLR Database (State
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women are the large majority of the "preschool" workforce,248 a
narrow interpretation that finds that preschools are not covered
under the Act results in a female-dominated area of the workforce
earning below minimum wage.
Thus, a feminist inquiry forms the starting point of a policy
centered analysis, in that a feminist inquiry recognizes that either a
broad or narrow interpretation of the 1972 amendment to the
FLSA results in a disproportionate impact on low-income women.
Therefore, the question remains: How can the judiciary, in inter
preting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, bring to light the nature
of the interpretive problem?
1.

Are Day Care Center Workers the Kind of Workers the
FLSA is Intended to Protect?

The history of the FLSA suggests that the term "preschool"
should be read broadly to include day care center workers. 249 With
each amendment to the Act, courts have consistently advocated a
liberal construction of an increasingly broad coverage area in favor
of the employee. 250 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that
"Congress intended instead, to achieve a uniform national policy of
guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment engaged in
by employees covered by the Act. "251
In particular, because women comprise most of the work force
in the area of child care,252 broad coverage in favor of the day care
center employee would effectuate a feminist goal of providing
ment by Professor Nancy S. Barrett before the Joint Economic Committee's Subcom
mittee on Investment, Jobs, and Prices) [hereinafter Statement of Professor Barrett]. In
this statement, Professor Barrett said "improved child care services, more flexible leave
policies and flexible working hours, and other supportive measures could make a con
siderable difference in women's labor force participation." Id.
248. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 126.
249. See supra Part I.A-D; Willis, supra note 28, at 608. "Although the FLSA has
been amended many times through the years, the congressional purpose of the Act, like
those of many other social laws, has remained anchored in the Commerce Clause. It is
under the guise of the broad commerce powers that the gradual, consistent extension of
the coverage of the [FLSA] has been and will continue to be accomplished." Id.
250. See Edwards v. Riverside Prod. Co., 85 F. Supp. 290, 293 (N.D. W.Va. 1949)
(holding that the Act should be construed strictly in favor of the employee); Wood v.
Central Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F. Supp. 40, 43 (W.D. Tenn. 1940) (indicating that Con
gress manifestly intended the courts to apply coverage under the Act broadly and
liberally).
251. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am.,
325 U.S. 161, 167 (1945) (holding that uniformity of coverage for employees engaged in
the same work is required under the FLSA).
252. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 126.
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greater economic opportunities for women. Thus, as a preliminary
matter, a policy-centered analysis overall accords wit!). the more
traditional interpretation that there is, within the Act, a presump
tion of inclusion in favor of the employee.
2.

Is the Traditional Analysis Consistent with the Larger
Purpose of the Act?

.The second question concerns the purpose of the Act and, in
particular, whether broad coverage in favor of the day care center
employee is consistent with that purpose. From the Act's inception,
its principal purpose has been to alleviate poverty.253 With each
amendment to the Act, its anti-poverty purpose has remained con
stant.254 The Act employs the minimum wage floor and maximum
hours provisions to effectuate its anti-poverty goal.255 Despite nu
merous amendments to the Act, the minimum wage and maximum
hours provisions have consistently remained the principal means to
effectuate the Act's purpose. Amendments to the minimum wage
and maximum hours provisions have merely increased the mini
mum wage, or increased the scope of coverage. 256 Furthermore,
until the 1966 amendment to the Act, the types of positions covered
under the Act were traditionally male-dominated. 257 In fact, the
1966 amendment was partially in response to the recognition that
many traditionally female positions were not covered under the
Act. 258
Although the FLSA's anti-poverty purpose has remained con
stant since its inception, workforce demographics have changed. 259
253. See supra Part LA for a discussion of the original and unchanging purpose of
the FLSA.
254. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). This section of the Act has remained substan
tively the same since the Act's inception in 1938. Any amendments to this section have
merely furthered the anti-poverty purpose by expanding the scope of coverage under
the Act, or raising the minimum wage. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 93-259, 87 Stat. 245 (codi
fied as amended at 29 U.S.c. § 202 (1994» (adding that "employment of persons in
domestic service in households affects commerce").
255. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1994).
256. See supra Part I.B-D for a discussion of amendments to the FLSA that ex
panded the scope of coverage under the minimum wage and maximum hours
provisions.
257. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the purpose of the 1966 amendment to
the FLSA.
258. See 112 CONGo REc. H11273 (daily ed. May 24, 1966) (statement of Rep.
Powell); see also supra note 56 for the text of Representative Powell's statement.
259. From 1963 to 1988 the number of women working or looking for work
outside the home increased by 29 million. See Statement of Professor Barrett, supra
note 247.
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The most dramatic change, relevant to the 1972 amendment to the
FLSA, has been in the labor statistics of women with preschool chil
dren. In 1960, fewer than 20% of women with preschool children
worked outside the home, whereas in 1988 over 50% of these wo
men worked outside the home. 26o This dramatic change in women's
work roles has affected the structure of family life and, conse
quently, affected the needs of the modern workforce. In particular,
since women are working in greater numbers, families can no
longer rely on the services of a full-time homemaker. 261 Further
more, "[t]he feminization of poverty is real."262 For instance, work
ing-aged women in Massachusetts earn only about two-thirds as
much per week as do working-aged men. 263
An additional change in labor is that people are increasingly
unable to work their way out of poverty. This phenomenon has
occurred, in part, because since the 1980s, wages for less skilled
workers decreased while wages for more skilled workers in
creased. 264 Additionally, the decrease in less skilled workers' abil
ity to earn a living wage is further diminished by the cost of child
care. For instance, in Massachusetts in 1995, a parent working full
time, year round at minimum wage, had gross earnings of $8,840. 265
The average cost for licensed child care in Massachusetts was $5,000
to $8,000 per year. 266 Thus, the cost of child care was well over half
of an individual's income.
While the Act has remained constant in its anti-poverty pur
pose, it has also remained static in its approach to eliminating pov
260.
261.

See id.
See id.

262. David T. Ellwood, Child Support Enforcement and Insurance: A Real Wel
fare Alternative 3 (Mar., 1992 revision) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Mal
colm Wiener Center for Social Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
. Harvard University).
263. See Tilly & Albelda, Occasional Paper, supra note 247, at 13.
264. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 1020 CONG., GROWTH IS NOT ENOUGH: WHY
THE RECOVERY OF THE 1980's DID SO LITfLE TO REDUCE POVERTY (Comm. Print
1991) (prepared by Rebecca M. Blank) [hereinafter 1991 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM.
PRINT]; William B. Cannon, Enlightened Localism: A Narrative Account of Poverty and
Education in the Great Society, 4 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 6, 58 (1985) ("For the vast
majority of poor people in America today there is no exit from poverty, either for
themselves or for their children, and they are beginning to recognize the permanent
nature of this status. ").
265. See Affidavit of Elaine Fersh, Executive Director of Parents United for
Child Care, submitted in opposition to Massachusetts' Request for Waiver Pursuant to
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, May 9, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Affidavit of
Elaine Fersh].

266.

See id.
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erty through positive work hours regulation. Thus, in interpreting
the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, because the FLSA is limited in
scope to changes in the minimum wage and overtime provisions,
the Act's anti-poverty purpose is thwarted. An interpretation of
the 1972 amendment to the FLSA in favor of the day care center
employee ignores the fact that economic and labor circumstances
have changed while the Act has remained single-focused in its ap
proach to eliminating poverty through minimum wage and overtime
provisions. 267
For instance, the effect of a broad construction in favor of day
care center workers may increase the costs of child care to the point
of making it too costly for low-income parents. 268 Similarly, a nar
row construction holding that day care centers do not have to com
ply with the FLSA's provisions contradicts the historical
presumption of broad coverage in favor of the employee. 269 Fur
thermore, this interpretation would also disproportionately affect
women because most day care workers are women. 270 Thus, in in
terpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, courts are forced to
choose between two groups of disadvantaged women. This occur
rence is due to the failure of the FLSA to address the complex na
ture of poverty.
The economic realities of modern life suggest that for the
FLSA to serve its purpose as an anti-poverty statute, more complex
solutions are needed, such as an increase in available, affordable
day care, to ensure that the purpose of the FLSA is not defeated. 271

267. The Act has addressed the issue of poverty by increasing minimum wage
progressively over time. See 29 u.s.c. § 206 (1994). It is the position of this Note that
this method no longer effectuates the FLSA's goals.
268. See Affidavit of Elaine Fersh, supra note 265, at 1; see also ILLINOIS DEP'T
OF PUBLIC AID REPORT, supra note 127.
269. See supra Part I.B-C for a discussion of the historical source of this
presumption.
270. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 126.
271. See Kathleen A. Murray, Child Care and the Law, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
261 (1985). Murray discusses several federal child care programs, concluding that cur
rent subsidies are inadequate. Two of the subsidies cited include: Dependant Care
Assistance Programs, see 26 U.S.C. § 129 (1994), and AFDC Child Care Expense Disre
gard, see 42 U.S.c. § 602(a) (1994). See Murray, supra, at 290-97. However, current
government subsidies are ineffective because waiting lists are extensive and, therefore,
not every eligible family can receive a subsidy. See HEALTH, EDUC., AND HUMAN
SERVICES DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE CHILD CARE: WORKING POOR AND
WELFARE RECIPIENTS FACE SERVICE GAPS 15 (1994) (report to the Committee on Ed
ucation and Labor, May 13, 1994) [hereinafter Child Care Report].
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3. How the Judiciary Might Inform the Legislature of the
Conflict in Policies: Applying a Policy-Centered
Analysis to Miss Paula's
The court in Miss Paula's noted the conflict concerning the
consequences that broad coverage in' favor of child day care center
workers had for day care center businesses as well as for the parents
served by these businesses. 272 However, the Sixth Circuit ended its
"policy analysis" with the recognition that Congress may have in
tended to eliminate low-wage operations. 273 In light of the
problems with the traditional approaches to statutory interpretation
employed by federal courts thus far, this section suggests one way
the Sixth Circuit in Miss Paula's might have applied a feminist pol
icy-centered analysis to the facts in light of the 1972 amendment to
the FLSA.
The conclusion that the FLSA requires Miss Paula's to pay
minimum wage and overtime may result in putting the day care
center out of business. 274 Alternatively, the center might remain in
business by increasing its fees, or eliminating some workers to de
crease its overhead. Increasing the cost of day care is presump
tively unreasonable. because the parents in Miss Paula's are
students or workers in one of the most economically depressed ar
eas in the United States. 275 The elimination of low-cost day care
forces parents to either pay more for day care or stay home with
their children. 276 Therefore, the parents must choose between
working or caring for their children. 277
Working is not a logical choice because if day care rates in
272.
273.
274.

See Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191, 1197 (6th Cir. 1994).
See iii.
See id. The fear that increasing the scope of coverage under the Act would

result in enterprises going out of business was expressed with each amendment that
broadened coverage. See supra Part I.B-D for a thorough discussion of the issues in
volved in expanding the scope of coverage under the Act.
275. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1192.
276. Department of Labor statistics from 1991 (unpublished) show that the lower
a family's income is, the greater the percentage of income is spent on day care:
Percent of Income
Monthly Family Income
Spent on Daycare
Under $1,500
22%
1,500-$2,999
11 %
$3,000-$4,499
7%
$4,500 and over
5%
Unpublished Department of Labor Statistics, 1991; see also Affidavit of Elaine Fersh,
supra note 265.
277. Certainly, there may be other choices for the parents such as leaving the
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crease, most, if not all, of the parents' money earned will go to pay
day care costs and expenses.278 Thus, requiring Miss Paula's to
comply with the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions
places these parents in a lose-lose situation, where they are forced
to remove their child from day care and stop working. Addition
ally, the increased labor costs may, in turn, force the center out of
business. The elimination of one business in a rural area with se
verely limited economic opportunities would generate a higher un
employment rate which contradicts the policy of the FLSA.279
Alternatively, not requiring Miss Paula's to comply with the
requirements of the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provi
sions is inconsistent with case precedent suggesting broad coverage
in favor of the employee. Although a job paying under minimum
wage may be comparatively attractive to unemployment in the eco
nom:ically depressed region of Appalachia, the Act's application
cannot depend on regional economic factors. Furthermore, the
provisions of the Act are intended to serve an anti-poverty purpose
by increasing wages. Thus, any interpretation that advocates wages
below minimum wage cannot be consistent with the FLSA.
Although broad coverage in favor of the day care center em
ployee is consistent with case precedent and the history of the
FLSA as an anti-poverty provision,280 the court is unable to effectu
ate this purpose adequately under the Act. While requiring Miss
Paula's to comply with the Act's provisions increases the economic
opportunities for some workers, it effectively displaces other work
ers by making day care too costly for low-income workers. Thus, in
effect, interpreting Congress's treatment of "preschool" to include
day care centers as covered enterprises defeats the Act's anti-pov
erty purpose because of Congress's failure to adequately address
the day care needs of the working poor. 281
Although not directly part of the FLSA, the issue of adequate
low-cost day care is inextricably linked to the interpretation of the
child with family or friends. Presumably, however, the parents already considered this
before spending the money to send their· child to day care.
278. The parents would have to earn well over minimum wage to make day care
in the center economically feasible. This seems unlikely given the center's clientele of
primarily college students and low-income working mothers. See Affidavit of Elaine
Fersh, supra note 265.
279. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the FLSA's anti-poverty purpose.
280. See supra Part I.A-C for a discussion of the history of the FLSA as an anti
poverty provision.
281. See Murray, supra note 271, at 290-97 for a list of some of the current federal
subsidies available for child care.
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1972 amendment to the FLSA. Congress should study the negative
effects of broad coverage of the FLSA's scope with an eye toward
creating supplemental provisions that fully address the complex na
ture of poverty such as the need for sufficient, low-cost day care. 282
Absent an initiative by Congress in this direction, a feminist policy
centered analysis that outlines clearly the intertwined nature of
low-cost daY' care and the FLSA's anti-poverty purpose is a neces
sary interpretive method.
In the end, a policy-centered analysis, founded on a feminist
interpretive analysis, might reach the same result as the Sixth Cir
cuit did in Miss Paula's: that is, that the center. is required to comply
with the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of the
FLSA. However, under a policy-centered analysis, judicial scrutiny
of the causes and effects of the outcome would be explicitly dis
cussed as part of the court's opinion. In addition, this method
should reveal other areas the legislature might need to address in
order to effectuate the FLSA's goals. Information could be shared
with Congress through the vehicle of section 204( d)(l) of the FLSA
which provides that the Secretary of Labor shall report to Congress
biennially to make recommendations for amendments to the ACt. 283
The Secretary of Labor's Annual Report to Congress includes a liti
gation section. In the litigation section, the Secretary outlines the
results of litigation on the FLSA presumably with the intent to out
line for Congress significant problem areas. Thus, if the judiciary
did not view policy as beyond its purview, the conflicts and inconsis
tencies of the Act as seen through the eyes of the judiciary, might
be revealed through this process.
Ultimately, because the Act. fails to address the relationship
that exists between the Act's provisions, its purpose and broader
economic realities, public policy considerations become paramount
in the interpretive process. Although traditionally public policy is
sues were thought to transcend the judicial function, a policy-cen
tered analysis of the FLSA suggests that public policy issues are
intimately tied to the judicial role as administrators of justice.

282. See Child Care Report, supra note 271, at 13-15 for a discussion of the gaps
in child care subsidies for eligible families.
283. See 29 U.S.c. § 204(d)(1) (1994). This provision requires the Secretary of
Labor to annually evaluate the state of employment opportunities, and propose legisla
tion consistent with effectuating the Act's objectives. See id. In Fiscal Year 1990, the
Secretary's 26 page report to Congress included a six page litigation section. See 1991
MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 6-13.

1997]

ANTI-POVERTY LEGISLATION IN THE MODERN ERA

273

CONCLUSION

Because of the lack of assistance for poor working people with
children, broad inclusion in favor of the day care center employee
under the FLSA, while logical given the Act's history, intent, and
purpose to improve employees' work status, conflicts with the es
sence of the Act as an anti-poverty statute. Although adequate day
care is not directly related to the FLSA's provisions, this public pol
icy issue is inextricably entwined with interpretation of the Act's
provisions.
This Note does not suggest that the minimum wage and over
time provisions of the Act should be abolished, nor that broad cov
erage under the Act should be discontinued. Instead, this Note
suggests that while the judicial role in interpreting the Act is re
stricted by legislative inadequacies, the judicial role should not be
restrained from analyzing the effects of these inadequacies. There
fore, a policy-centered method that reveals the problems inherent
in the Act, as a feminist policy-centered analysis does, is not beyond
the purview of the court.
Particularly, where legislative inadequacies thwart the inter
pretive process, the judiciary must take public policy issues into
consideration when interpreting the Act. Furthermore, the Act
contains a vehicle for reporting the conflicts which emerge in inter
preting the Act. Section 204( d)(l) specifically requires the Secre
tary of Labor to make recommendations biennially for further
legislative action.
A feminist policy-centered method is, nevertheless, limited.
Congress must address the complexities of poverty if the Act is to
continue its anti-poverty purpose. Simple answers, such as raising
the minimum wage, are no longer effective to increase employee
bargaining power and eliminate poverty. In fact, they may have the
opposite effect. Thus, for the Fair Labor Standards Act to remain a
viable anti-poverty statute, Congress ultimately must respond to the
increasingly complex circumstances which create poverty in a com
prehensive and systematic way.
Laura C. Edmonds

